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Cyber-attack Detection for Converter-based Distributed DC Microgrid:
Observer-based Approaches
Abstract
DC microgrids (MGs) are complex systems connecting various renewable energy sources to different
types of loads based on distributed networks. However, the strong reliance on communication networks
makes DC MGs vulnerable to intentional cyber-attacks. In this article, two typical types of observer-based
approaches are presented to address the attack detection problem for distributed DC microgrid systems.
The disturbance decoupling approach is utilized to eliminate the influence of unknown load conditions and
the coupling effect between distributed generation units (DGUs) to the residuals. The proposed method
is easy to design and with less computation complexity. The performances of the provided scheme are
validated by dSPACE-based DC MG platform.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO ATTACK DETECTION
A. Microgrid Security
DC Microgrids, referred to as the next-generation power systems, are receiving great attention from
both industry and academia. Integrated with distributed generations, energy storage systems and a variety
of loads, a DC MG functions as a localized power grid that can be operated independently or connected
to utility grids. With the rapid development of technology in communication networks, the framework of
DC MGs tends to be more distributed, intelligent and tightly integrated with networks. Applications of
DC MGs can be found in the Internet of Things, Industry 4.0, Smart Cities, etc.
However, due to the strong dependence on networks, the DC MG is more vulnerable to security threats.
Compared with a conventional power system, the microgrid network has more risks of being corrupted by
malicious attackers, as it incorporates millions of devices and users. Generally, the function of a potential
controller heavily relies on the reliability of measurement devices or sensors. The controller may generate
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Fig. 1: Infrastructure destruction under cyber-attacks
faulty control signals when the measurements are corrupted by an attacker [1], which may cause an
undesired power sharing [2], frequency oscillation [3], voltage restoration [4] and stability issues [5]. As
a consequence, the renewable generating units may not be able to extract the maximum available power
from nature or achieve proper power sharing among microgrid, the energy storage units may fail to provide
the required amount of power or operate with the optimal economic dispatch [6]. More seriously, as seen
from Fig. 1, a malicious attacker can apply some kinds of attacks to the DC MG system, compromise
the MG control and lead to disruptive events in the society.
B. Motivations
To ensure a safe and reliable operation of microgrids, the information security requirements: confi-
dentiality, integrity and availability [7] should be considered. Availability is the primary requirement of
microgrids, which ensures the reliable access to and use of information. Data integrity is the secondary
but increasingly critical requirement that prevents unauthorized users from modifying the information.
Confidentiality serves as the third important requirement to preserve restrictions on information access.
Currently, the DC MGs are generally designed with technologies that can protect against potential
component failures as well as communication delays and data dropouts during operations [8]. However,
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the attack detection differs from fault detection that mainly focuses on potential known events and can be
studied case by case. Whereas, attack detection is dealing with malicious attack whose pattern is unknown
to the designer. Due to the development of various intelligent attacks, traditional technologies behave very
limited to secure the MG system. It is therefore important to reexamine the existing techniques for attack
detection of DC microgrids.
C. Related Work
Due to the great impact of attacks on microgrid systems, it is essential to provide effective countermea-
sures against cyber-attacks, which can be designed both in cyber-layer and physical layer [9]. The typical
defense mechanism deployed in cyber-layer is data authentication, realized by secure communication
protocol design [10]. Data authentication, also known as watermarking or encryption methods relies on
the external message that can provide characterizations to the secure signals [11]. The data without the
related characterizations are deemed as malicious attacks. From the perspective of the physical layer,
attack detection combined with resilience operations is the key method to eliminate the effect of attacks
[12]. The attack detection can trigger an alarm in the presence of cyber-attacks. While, the resilience of
microgrids defined as the capability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from attacks, can provide the
microgrids with some autonomous characteristics to achieve system restoration. Such methods can be: i)
improving the topology or hardware redundancy, ii) reinforcing the infrastructure of microgrids and iii)
adopting a secure control function that is able to prevent the system from destruction under cyber-attacks
[13].
Taking the cyber-security issues into consideration, the design and analysis of attack detection schemes
for a microgrid in the physical layer have been recognized more and more attractive in literature both
for the linear system [14]–[31] and nonlinear system [32]. Fig. 2 presents the summary of various attack
detection methods. Generally speaking, the studies on the attack detection can be classified into two
categories, i.e., model-based scheme [14]–[31] and data-based scheme [33]–[40]. For the model-based
scheme, a general analytical approach for attack detection problems is the use of state estimation method
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Fig. 2: Summary of attack detection approaches
by analyzing the MG model and the measurements [14]–[18]. However, this method may fail when
detecting some intelligent attacks, when the attacker holds some knowledge of the current configuration
of the microgrid making the attack signal might be consistent with the detection mechanism [26], [30].
To overcome this limit, observer-based methods are promising alternatives to address the attack detection
problems [21]–[24]. Normally, a carefully designed residual is compared with a fixed or time various
threshold to determine if there is an attack [16]. Furthermore, statistical method, e.g., χ2 detector, is
another dimension to detect random attacks by capturing the statistical behaviors of states [19], [20],
[25]–[29]. However, it needs extra improvement in the case where the distribution of attack is unchanged
[25], [31]. Moreover, data-based approaches have also been introduced for detecting attacks in smart grid
systems [33]–[37]. These solutions generally rely on machine learning or statistical mechanisms to infer a
model for the system under inspection from historical data and online measured signals. In other words, the
monitored system is treated as a black box. Different data-based techniques, e.g., deep learning methods,
can be then employed to recognize the behavior features of attacks and achieve the attack detection.
However, these methods usually face a heavy computational burden to train a fully connected network
[38], [39].
Although remarkable progress has been made in detecting attacks during the past decade, most of the
studies mainly focus on centralized architectures. Indeed, these approaches are becoming increasingly
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unpractical to deal with attacks as a result of the complexity induced by large scale distributed DC MG
systems. Furthermore, traditional state estimation and observer-based method may not achieve a reliable
state estimation due to the existence of unknown system disturbances (load change, voltage oscillation,
neighbor voltage change, etc.) [41]. The interactions between distributed generation units of DC MG could
also result in a coupling effect, which also poses a challenge to the design of attack detection algorithms.
Therefore, the design of attack detection for distributed DC MG system should lie in exploiting the
relationships among interconnected subsystems [42].
Recently, a group of distributed attack detection schemes have been proposed in terms of different
ways to deal with the coupling effect of the system [16], [43]–[45]. The model decomposition method
can achieve a distributed attack detection by decomposing the system into several subsystems based on
the system Laplacian matrix [43], [44]. However, it requires a great computational complexity in the
decomposition progress and thus is undesirable in the implementation of large scale systems. Besides,
disturbance decoupling methods play a key role in distributed attack detection approaches, where the
coupling effects among neighboring units are usually seen as external disturbances. These approaches are
commonly implemented with observers [45].
Besides the aforementioned methods, in which much attention is paid to investigating the relations
between control signals and measurements by appropriate model, the signal-based attack detection ap-
proaches are alternative methods that have been implemented in microgrid systems. Intrusion detection is
one typical detection approach that monitors the signals in the communication lines in real-time [46], [47].
The individual agent is deemed to be attacked and will be isolated from the system after an abnormal
behavior is detected. Generally, they can be divided into anomaly detection [46] and invariant-based
detection approaches [47]. Anomaly detection approaches are developed by exploring the variable-related
metrics, which may be violated by the abnormal agent. The advantage of anomaly detection methods is
that they do not rely on the pre-defined thresholds. However, the implementation of these methods may
lead to increased operation costs and degraded system performances [48]. Invariants-based detection is
an alternative approach to evaluating the system security. Invariants are microgris properties that do not
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change over time, such as the bound of voltage and current of each converters. However, historical data
are always needed in the detection approach, therefore, this method also suffers from higher system cost.
Specifically, the consensus check method is also a reliable monitoring approach that can be adopted in
the detection of a microgrid system, where a metric is calculated by local and the neighboring states [49].
The system is usually designed with a proper consensus protocol. If the distributed voltages, currents or
power are detected not following the consensus theory, then an attack is assumed.
D. Contributions
Due to the lower computational burden and system cost compared with data-based and signal-based
detection methods, the model-based detection approach is mainly considered in this paper. To the best
of our knowledge, there is little research working on distributed attack detection for the DC MG system.
Although observer-based methods show a promising trend in attack detection applications, there have been
no studies explaining how to apply these technologies to distributed DC microgrids. To address the above
challenges, an observer-based detection scheme against cyber-attacks for distributed DC MG system is
proposed in this paper. The main contributions of this work are listed are as follows:
1) Attack detection framework for distributed DC microgrid system: First, a real time cyber-attack
detection framework is proposed for distributed DC microgrid with only local information of the entire
system. Therefore, it is easy for scalable implementation. Second, by a disturbance decoupling method,
the presented attack detection schemes are robust against the unknown load conditions and coupling effect
among distributed generation units.
2) Observer-based detection approaches: A comprehensive design progress of Luenberger-like observer
(LLO) and unknown input observer (UIO) based attack detection strategies are provided. The detection
strategies are complete in terms of observer design and threshold computation. Different from the existing
methods, the observers are designed in the sense of residual generation. Furthermore, the sensitivity to
the attack is increased by an optimal design of observer and time-various threshold. The pros and cons
of Luenberger-like observer and UIO is given as last.
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II. PROBLEM FORMULATION: SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODEL
A. Electrical Model of DC Microgrids
Considering a distributed generation unit composed of a DC voltage source, a Buck converter and loads,
the DC MG can be obtained by interconnecting N distributed generation units through power lines. Fig.
3 (a) and (b) show the electrical structure of DGU i and DC MG system.
In particular, as mentioned in [50], a ZIP load that includes a constant impedance load, a constant
current load and a constant power load can be represented by one equivalent impedance load RLi and
one equivalent current load ILi. Moreover, with Quasi Stationary Line approximation, the interconnection
































where variables Vi, Ii are i-th point of common coupling (PCC) bus voltage, filter current respectively;
Vti are the voltage command of the converter; Ri, Li are the electrical parameters; Ci are the capacitor
at PCC bus; Moreover, Vj are the voltage at the PCC of each neighboring DGUs, j ∈ Ni and Rij are the
resistance of the power lines.
B. Description of System Model
Consider a DGU with an attack on the communication line between converter and controller. The model
of DGU i can be described in state space as:
ẋ[i](t) = Aix[i](t) +Bi[u[i](t) + a1[i](t)] + Eid[i](t)
y[i](t) = Ci[x[i](t) + a2[i](t)]
(2)
where x[i](t) = [Vi, ILi]T ∈ Rn is system state; u[i](t) = [Vti] ∈ Ru is the control input; y[i](t) ∈ Rm is the







+ ILi) ∈ Rd is the unknown disturbance, which is the
combination of coupling effect (neighbor voltage) and load conditions; a1[i](t) ∈ Ru and a2[i](t) ∈ Rm are
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Fig. 3: Microgrid system structure and proposed detection approach
actuator attack and sensor attack, respectively. If there is no attack on the system, then a1[i](t), a2[i](t) = 0,
otherwise they can be an arbitrary value. Ai, Bi, Ci and Ei are proper system matrices.
C. Observer Model
To detect the cyber-attacks, two typical observers (Luenberger-like observer and unknown input ob-
server) shown in Fig. 3 (c) and (d) are implemented in each converter to monitor the system performance.
For system (2), the LLO and UIO of DGU i under consideration can be described by:
ˆ̇xL[i](t) = Aix̂L[i](t) +Biu[i](t) +Gi[y[i](t)− ŷL[i](t)]
ŷL[i](t) = Cix̂L[i](t)
rL[i](t) = Qi[y[i](t)− ŷL[i](t)]

ˆ̇z[i](t) = Fiz[i](t) + TiBiu[i](t) +Kiy[i](t)
x̂U [i](t) = z[i](t) +Hiy[i](t)
rU [i](t) = y[i](t)− Cix̂U [i](t)
(3)
where x̂[L,U ][i](t) ∈ Rn, rL[i](t) ∈ Rp and rU [i](t) ∈ Rn are the estimated states and residual signals of
LLO and UIO, where p = m−rank(CiEi); Gi, Qi and Fi, Ti, Ki, Hi are observer matrices to be designed.
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As noticed from (3) that the proposed observer can monitor the system with only local measurements of
each DGU. The attack detection scheme can be achieved by comparing the residuals with a threshold. If
the residuals exceed the threshold, an attack is assumed.
III. OBSERVER DESIGN AND ANALYSIS FOR ATTACK DETECTION
The generation of residuals is the most important task in observer-based attack detection techniques.
To develop a reliable detection scheme, the following three criteria are usually adopted in the design of
observers.
1) Stability criterion: the eigenvalues of observers (3) are located in the left half plane.
2) Robustness criterion: the effect of disturbances on residuals should be minimized.
3) Sensitivity criterion: the effect of attacks on residuals should be maximized.
For brevity, the subscript ([i]) is omitted in this section as this does not affect the discussion of observer
design. Instead, the subscript [L] and [U ] are adopted to indicate the values related to LLO and UIO,
respectively.
A. Disturbance Decoupling
The robustness criterion attempts to reduce the effect of disturbance on the monitor scheme. For LLO
and UIO, the Laplace transformed residual responses are obtained from (3) as:
rL(s) = Gra[L](s)a(s) +Grd[L](s)d(s)
rU(s) = Gra[U ](s)a(s) +Grd[U ](s)d(s) +Gru[U ](s)u(s) +Grz[U ](s)z(s) +Gry[U ](s)y(s)
(4)
where Gr× are the transfer functions from each input to the residuals.
It can be seen from (4) that, due to the existence of exogenous disturbances, the residual is not zero
in the absence of attack. The unknown load conditions and coupling effects are the sources of false and
missed alarms. To make residual signals only sensitive to attacks, it is necessary to null the transfer
function from those inputs to residuals, which requests:
Grd[L](s) = Grd[U ](s) = Gru[U ](s) = Grz[U ](s) = Gry[U ](s) = 0 (5)
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Therefore, the design problem is to find the proper observer matrices to meet the requirement (5).
A general necessary condition for the observers is that the maximum number of disturbances cannot be
larger than the number of the independent measurements, which is satisfied in the presented DC microgrid
model (2). The design problem of attack detection for presented distributed DC MG is solved by the left
eigenvalue assignment approach for LLO and directly design approach for UIO in this paper. The proof
of existence is omitted, as it goes beyond the scope of this article.
B. Design Freedom
The design problem of requirement (5) only restricts the choice of parts of observer matrices. Indeed,
there is extra design freedom (e.g., eigenvalues of the observer) that can be used to improve the sensitivity
criterion. Generally, the positions of eigenvalues affect the performance of the observer greatly. However,
they are commonly determined by arbitrary values, which may not be the optimal solution. In this paper,
the attack detectability is improved by an optimization problem where the norm of the transfer function
from attacks to residuals is selected as the evaluation index. For the DC MG (2), the observer design




s.t. Grd[L] = Grd[U ](s) = Gru[U ](s) = Grz[U ](s) = Gry[U ](s) = 0
(6)
where the related functions are given as follows:
Gra[L](s) = QC +QC(sI − A+GC)−1(B −GC)
Gra[U ](s) = C(sI − A+HCA+K1C)−1[(I −HC)B −K1C −HCs]
where K1 = K − FH . Noticed that the matrix G,Q and K1, H determine the observer eigenvalues as
well as the magnitude of residuals. It is evident to find that the closer the eigenvalues to the imaginary
axis, the faster the system responds. Additionally, the higher the |Q|, |H| or the farther the eigenvalues
to the imaginary axis, the higher the residual magnitude.
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C. Residual Evaluation Criterion
The final step for designing the attack detection scheme is to determine the threshold. To detect the
cyber-attack more quickly and avoid false alarms, an adaptive threshold is constructed based on DGU
dynamics. Given the presented observer (3), the state estimation error e(t) = x(t)− x̂(t) and residual can
be written as following dynamics after disturbance decoupling:
ėL(t) = (A−GC)eL(t) + Ed(t) +Ba1(t)−GCa2(t)
rL(t) = QCeL(t) +QCa2(t)
ėU(t) = (A−HCA−K1C)eLU(t) + (I −HC)Ba1(t)−K1Ca2(t)−HCȧ2(t)
rU(t) = CeU(t)
(7)












where |ē[L,U ](0)| > |e[L,U ](0)| and 0 ≥ λ̄ ≥ λ[L,U ] hold, Λ is a diagonal matrix whose elements should be
greater than 1, λ[L,U ] are the eigenvalues of observers, ρ[L,U ] ≥ 0 are proper bound values which can be
determined by multiple experimental tests.
It can also be obtained from (7) and (8) that, the LLO cannot achieve a state estimation as the estimation
errors are still coupled from disturbances. In contrast, the UIO can achieve a state estimation function.
However, the UIO usually asks for strong existence conditions than LLO.
D. Stability Analysis to Parameter Perturbations
Considering the electrical parameters (LC filter inductance, resistance) may change during operations,
the stability analysis of the proposed observer is provided quantitatively. According to the analysis above,
the poles of the observer can be freely designed as long as it meets the requirement (5). To analysis the
12
Fig. 4: Pole loci of the observer under filter parameter changes
dynamic behavior of the system with inductor parameter changes, the pole loci, which contains a fixed
pole and a varying pole, is shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4 (a) shows the pole loci with the inductance increasing from 90% to 110% of nominal value. It
shows that the poles on the real axis move toward the imaginary axis and even go to the right half plane
(RHP), which leads to the system unstable. Similarly, Fig. 4 (b) shows the poles with inductor resistance
changes from 90% to 110% of nominal value. As can be seen that, the poles may locate in the RHP with
a lower resistance value.
It can be concluded from the results that the system may become unstable with higher inductance and
lower resistance values. As a consequence, a new constraint for eigenvalue should be considered in the
observer designing process (6) that the poles must lay in the left half plane given the maximum inductance
value Li and minimum resistance value Ri under consideration as:
λij[Li,Ri] < 0 (10)
In addition, the system dynamics cannot be affected by capacitor values provided by the proposed
observer (3). Therefore, the pole loci under capacitance changes are omitted.
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IV. PERFORMANCE VALIDATION
Experimental results are given to verify the effectiveness of the proposed detection scheme. The control
and monitor scheme is implemented in a dSPACE-based MG platform, which mainly composed of a
dSPACE controller, a DC source, three Danfoss converters and DC load, as shown in Fig. 5. The setup is
placed in the Center for Research for Microgrids (CROM) facilities, department of Energy Technology,
Aalborg University (www.crom.et.aau.dk). The parameters of each DGU and the MG system are listed in
Fig. 6.
The control function is designed based on a standard hierarchical structure, where the primary controller
is used to provide a stable output voltage and the secondary controller is adopted to ensure power sharing.
In the following, the performance capabilities of the proposed detection strategy are provided. Consider
the DC microgrid with topology in Fig. 3(b), where an attacker gains access to the voltage measurements
through attacks and is able to change the measurements. Noticed that, although the voltage demand is
50 V, the actual voltages of converters may shift to achieve the power sharing function. As a result, the
currents are the same among distributed converters.
Fig. 5: Experimental setup and configuration
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Fig. 6: Electrical parameters.
A. Luenberger-like Observer
1) Scenario I: Studies in this case verify the robustness against load change conditions of the presented
LLO-based detection approach. In this case, the DC load decreases and increases at 5 s and 10 s
respectively, and a constant voltage sensor attack of 0.4 V is launched on the system. The bus voltages,
output currents, residuals and corresponding thresholds of converter 1 are shown in Fig. 7 (a) and (b). As
shown, there are few oscillations in voltage dynamics and 0.1 A changes in output current after shifting
of loads, while the residual remains zero dynamic. This verifies that the load change conditions have little
effect on the detection scheme. The false data is injected into the voltage sensor of converter 1 at 15 s.
Accordingly, the voltage measurement increases and thus leads to the decrease of neighboring voltages
by 0.2 V. The residual also increases rapidly after cyber-attacks, which verifies the effectiveness of the
presented approach. In addition, as seen from Fig. 7(b) that the proposed detection approach is more
sensitive to attacks compared with the traditional method provided by the larger residual signals.
2) Scenario II: Studies in this case verify the robustness against the change of neighboring voltage
conditions of presented LLO. In this case, the neighboring voltage increases and decreases by 0.8 V at 5
s and 10 s respectively. Then a constant voltage sensor attack of 0.4 V is launched on the system at 15 s.
The bus voltages, output currents, residuals and corresponding thresholds of converter 1 are shown in Fig.
7 (c) and (d). It can be seen that there are oscillations in the current responses after neighboring voltage
changes, while the residual remains unchanged. While, in Fig. 7 (d), after injecting a stealth attack into
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Fig. 7: Detection performance of Luenberger-like observer
the system, the residual increase directly. It is worth to be noticed that although the oscillations of both
voltage and current dynamics induced by the neighboring voltage changes are larger than that after cyber-
attacks, the residual is only sensitive to the attacks, which shows the reliability of the presented detection
approach. Furthermore, one can also see that the magnitude of residuals with the proposed method is
comparatively larger than ones with the conventional approach. Therefore, it can be concluded that the
observer is completely decoupled from the unknown disturbances and more sensitive to the attacks.
B. Unknown Input Observer
1) Scenario I: Similarly, in this case, the DC load is changed at 5 s and 10 s respectively, and a
constant voltage sensor attack of 0.4 V is launched on the system. The corresponding measurements and
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Fig. 8: Detection performance of unknown input observer
thresholds of converter 1 are shown in Fig. 8 (a) and (b). As shown that the residual remains unchanged
under load change conditions. Furthermore, the test results show that the attacks are promptly detected
by the increased residuals after the injection of attacks, which illustrates the effective of the designed
observer.
2) Scenario II: The test results in this case are shown in Fig. 8 (c) and (d). It can be seen that although
the effects of attacks on system dynamics are relatively smaller, there is a rapid increase in the residual.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the designed UIO is decoupled from the unknown disturbances. In




Taking the cyber-security issues into account, the observer-based attack detection scheme has been
presented in this article to address the attack detection problem for the distributed DC microgrid system.
A comprehensive design procedure is provided using a Luenberger-like observer and an unknown input
observer. The benefits of the proposed approach are threefold: first, because the observer is able to detect
attacks with only local information of the MG system, it can therefore facilitate a scalable implementation.
Second, with the disturbance decoupling method, the residual is decoupled from unknown load conditions
and neighbor voltage changes. Third, the detectability of the observer is improved by extra design freedom,
which makes the detection scheme more sensitive to cyber-attacks. A time-varying threshold is designed
based on the dynamics of the DC MG system. Experimental tests are presented to illustrate the effectiveness
and achievable performance of the proposed scheme.
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